Oliver Dickie and Olivia Peake consider the judgment in R (The Greyhound Board of Great Britain Limited) v The Welsh Ministers [2026] EWHC 670 (Admin).
In dismissing a judicial review of a decision by the Welsh Ministers to ban greyhound racing in Wales, the Administrative Court sitting in Cardiff has held that there is no common law duty to consult before introducing legislation into the Senedd. Recognising such a duty would, the Court found, amount to judicial interference in legislative procedures and infringe the constitutional separation of powers reflected in the Government of Wales Act 2006 (“GoWA”).
As well as examining the GoWA in detail, the court reviewed the established constitutional principles applicable to law makers in Scotland and Westminster, and considered the extent to which they apply to Wales. The judgment therefore provides an engaging reminder of how the separation of power between the judiciary and legislature operates in the UK more broadly.
Background
- 18 February 2025 – The Deputy First Minister of Wales (“DFM”) made a statement in the Senedd Cymru expressing his belief that “now is the right time to move to ban greyhound racing in Wales”. He reported that the Welsh Ministers would be establishing an implementation group to engage with stakeholders, learn lessons from other countries’ approaches, and to advise the government “how a ban will come into force, the legislative approach and when it will be delivered”.
- 29 April 2025 – The Counsel General confirmed that the upcoming legislative programme for the Senedd would include primary legislation to ban greyhound racing in Wales.
- 19 May 2025 – The Greyhound Board of Great Britain Limited (the “Greyhound Board”) – a company representing the interests of participants in the greyhound racing industry – applied for permission to bring a judicial review challenging the DFM’s 18 February statement on the grounds that there had been an unlawful failure to consult before making it.
- 29 September 2025 – The DFM introduced the Prohibition of Greyhound Racing (Wales) Bill into the Senedd. The Bill then passed the four stages of the Senedd’s legislative procedure between 29 September 2025 and 17 March 2026. (At the time of the hearing of the judicial review claim, the Bill had yet to be presented for Royal Assent.)
- 24 November 2025 – permission to apply for judicial review was granted by Eyre J.
- 24 December 2025 – The Greyhound Board applied for permission to amend its claim to challenge the 29 September decision by the Welsh Ministers to introduce the Bill into the Senedd.
The Judicial Review Claim
At the substantive hearing, the court was invited to determine: (1) the judicial review of the DFM’s statement of 18 February 2025 that it was the right time to ban greyhound racing; and (2) the application to amend the claim to challenge the subsequent decision of the Welsh Ministers to introduce the Bill into the Senedd.
The Greyhound Board’s sole ground of challenge was that these decisions were unlawful due to the failure to carry out a public consultation before deciding to ban greyhound racing in Wales, which – it was said – was in breach of a legitimate expectation arising from statements made by the Welsh Ministers that they would consult before making any changes to policy in relation to greyhound racing.
The case gave rise to two constitutional issues:
- Whether Welsh Ministers were under a common law duty to consult before introducing a Bill into the Senedd.
- Whether the court had the power to make orders or declarations, the effect of which would be to prevent or reverse the introduction and progress of a Bill in the Senedd.
The court recognised (and indeed the Greyhound Board acknowledged) the novel and constitutional significance of the second question, in that the consequence of granting the relief sought would be that a Bill which had passed its legislative stages in the Senedd would not be law, even if it received Royal Assent.
Court’s Findings
The court permitted the amendment of the claim to challenge the 29 September decision by the Welsh Ministers to introduce the Bill into the Senedd, on the basis that it raised an important constitutional issue concerning the extent of the procedural obligations which apply to those introducing legislation in the Senedd and the extent of the court’s supervisory functions.
However, the court went on to dismiss the claim, holding as follows:
- The GoWA establishes the Senedd as the legislature in which laws are made for the people of Wales by their democratically elected representatives. In areas falling within its legislative competence, the Senedd determines for itself whether a proposal is in the interests of the people of Wales.
- A consequence of this is that the courts cannot review Acts of the Senedd on grounds of rationality, unreasonableness or arbitrariness. In terms of procedure, an Act of the Senedd remains valid despite any invalidity in the proceedings leading to its enactment – this is generally a feature of legislatures with plenary powers and is also explicitly provided for by section 107 of the GoWA.
- The introduction of a Bill into the Senedd set in train a legislative procedure comparable in aim to a consultation process governing administrative decision-making. The Senedd is in charge of that process. It was not for the court to interfere with the Senedd’s procedure for scrutinising and debating the proposed legislation, which would be inconsistent with the Senedd’s plenary powers and contrary to the principle of the separation of powers. Further, once the Bill becomes an Act, any invalidity in introducing it engaged s. 107 GoWA and was incapable of affecting its validity. It would be “anomalous” if the court could rely on that same invalidity to grant relief affecting the Bill’s validity.
- GoWA provides for a separate procedure for challenging a Bill on particular grounds by particular individuals. It would be inconsistent with the GoWA if a broad range of individuals were permitted to challenge the validity of the Bill outside of this procedure.
Tying this together, the court concluded that “the recognition of a common law duty on the Welsh Ministers to consult before introducing legislation in the Senedd would infringe the constitutional separation of powers reflected in the GoWA” and, were the court to entertain a challenge to the decision of the Welsh Ministers to introduce a Bill into the Senedd based on an alleged failure to consult beforehand, that “might well be seen as inconsistent with, and as circumventing, the protection from procedural challenges accorded to Acts of the Senedd by s. 107(3)”.
Having rejected the challenge to the decision to introduce the Bill, the court decided it would be inappropriate to determine the challenge to the DFM’s earlier statement of 18 February 2025. That challenge had been rendered academic and, in any event, the Bill had completed its legislative stages such that the determination of a claim alleging a procedural flaw at the pre-legislative stage would be contrary to the separation of powers.
The court’s conclusions are consistent with those reached by other courts in rejecting consultation challenges to decisions to introduce primary legislation into the UK Parliament, save that the principles of Parliamentary privilege relied on in such cases do not apply to the Senedd, hence the reasoning in this case was based on the constitutional separation of powers.
Implications of Judgment
Perhaps the primary takeaway is the exploration and confirmation of the separation of power between the judiciary and legislature as it applies to the Senedd Cymru. This is obviously not a novel concept in itself, but is the first time it has been determined in the Welsh context.
The case confirms that – as in Scotland and Westminster – there is no common law duty to consult before initiating a Bill into the Senedd, whose legislative deliberations share the aim (albeit not the method) of a consultation process.
The court acknowledged the Senedd is subject to “certain statutory limits as to the content of its standing orders and as to other aspects of its procedure”, noting it might need to be considered in another case whether s. 107 GoWA would prevent an Act alleged to have been passed in breach of these limits from being challenged on procedural grounds (an issue which did not arise in this case).
Oliver Dickie is a Trainee Solicitor and Olivia Peake is a Senior Professional Support Lawyer at Sharpe Pritchard LLP.
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